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People evaluate a stranger’s trustworthiness from their facial fea-
tures in a fraction of a second, despite common advice “not to
judge a book by its cover.” Evaluations of trustworthiness have
critical and widespread social impact, predicting financial lending,
mate selection, and even criminal justice outcomes. Consequently,
understanding how people perceive trustworthiness from faces
has been a major focus of scientific inquiry, and detailed models
explain how consensus impressions of trustworthiness are driven
by facial attributes. However, facial impression models do not
consider variation between observers. Here, we develop a sensi-
tive test of trustworthiness evaluation and use it to document
substantial, stable individual differences in trustworthiness im-
pressions. Via a twin study, we show that these individual differ-
ences are largely shaped by variation in personal experience,
rather than genes or shared environments. Finally, using multivar-
iate twin modeling, we show that variation in trustworthiness
evaluation is specific, dissociating from other key facial evalua-
tions of dominance and attractiveness. Our finding that variation
in facial trustworthiness evaluation is driven mostly by personal
experience represents a rare example of a core social perceptual
capacity being predominantly shaped by a person’s unique envi-
ronment. Notably, it stands in sharp contrast to variation in facial
recognition ability, which is driven mostly by genes. Our study
provides insights into the development of the social brain, offers
a different perspective on disagreement in trust in wider society,
and motivates new research into the origins and potential mallea-
bility of face evaluation, a critical aspect of human social cognition.
trust | face evaluation | first impressions | behavioral genetics | classical
twin design
Trust is fundamental to human life: Without trust, society itselfwould not exist (1, 2). Who we trust and why have become
defining questions of our era as public trust in expertise is rapidly
declining in favor of trust based on rather more superficial
characteristics (2). For example, although popular advice com-
pels us not to “judge a book by its cover,” people readily place
their trust in others based on a superficial evaluation of their
facial features. Trust evaluations from faces wield widespread
social influence, predicting financial lending, consumer choices,
and criminal justice outcomes (3). At the extreme, untrustworthy-
looking people are more likely to receive the death penalty than
trustworthy-looking people, when convicted of a major crime (4).
Influential theories explain how face evaluations are formed, in-
cluding identifying trustworthiness as the primary dimension of face
evaluation (5–7) and suggesting that trustworthiness evaluation is
adaptive because it functions to detect threat (5–7). Unfortunately,
whereas trust decisions are fundamentally formed on an individual
level, the science of facial trust has mostly operated by examining
consensus trust evaluations at a group level (e.g., this face looks
more trustworthy than another to most people). Although certain
facial characteristics are broadly considered by most people to look
trustworthy (e.g., smiling, femininity, head tilt) (7, 8), very recent
research has suggested that people may disagree to a surprising
extent when judging trustworthiness from faces (9–11). Ignoring
individual trust evaluation is problematic for two reasons: first,
because current theory becomes disconnected from everyday, indi-
vidual decision making and, second, because we lack directly
meaningful data as to the degree of plasticity or capacity for change
in facial trust evaluation.
Here, we set out to provide an unprecedentedly thorough in-
vestigation of the nature of individual trust impressions and the
degree to which they are shaped by genetics, shared life experi-
ence, or personal life experience. We started by developing re-
liable tests of individual differences in facial trust evaluation,
using best-practice iterative test development procedures. We
used these tests to confirm that trustworthiness impressions are,
to a substantial degree, “in the eye of the beholder.” Despite the
overwhelming focus of previous work on consensus impressions,
therefore, trustworthiness impressions are also based on stable
individual differences that are unique to the individual. This
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disagreement in trust evaluation of faces parallels a more wide-
spread general trend in society as increasingly stark disagreement is
observed in whom we consider to be trustworthy (1).
The existence of large and stable individual differences in fa-
cial trustworthiness evaluation in turn raises the key question of
why people vary in their trustworthiness impressions. That is,
what casual mechanism(s) explain these individual differences?
Core face-processing abilities, such as individual differences in
face identity recognition, have been shown to be almost entirely
driven by genes (12–14). Trusting personality traits also show
strong genetic influences (15) as does general social trust (16).
Genetic factors might therefore also shape variation in facial
trustworthiness evaluation, especially given that trustworthiness
impressions are based on facial features that overlap with those
used for identity recognition (for example, eyebrow height, face
width, and so on) (7, 17). Indeed, major genetic influences on
human behavior are so ubiquitous that, to be complete, social
psychological theories of traits must consider such genetic in-
fluences (15). Yet, reliably measured traits that are primarily
shaped by environment factors, although rare in behavioral ge-
netics, do exist. Strikingly, for example, individual differences in
facial attractiveness evaluations result primarily from individual
experiences rather than genes (18), and attractive and trust-
worthy facial features partially overlap (for example, smiling is
both attractive and trustworthy) (19). Moreover, trustworthiness
evaluation has recently been shown to be shaped by contextual
factors, such that more typical (20), more familiar (21), and more
common (22) faces look more trustworthy. Experiences—in
particular, the “diet” of faces one encounters in daily life—may
therefore play an important role in trustworthiness perception.
Two individuals who experience different facial variation in their
environments, whether in real life or online, may learn to trust
different facial features (for example, blue or green eyes, narrow
or wide facial structure, and so on) as these particular features
become familiar. Social learning has also recently been shown to
influence trustworthiness evaluation: For example, people are
more likely to trust others who resemble trustworthy individuals
encountered in an initial economic transaction (23). Individual
trust interactions with others may therefore also act to drive
variation in trust evaluation between people. For example, after
experiencing trustworthy behavior from feminine-looking indi-
viduals, one learns to trust feminine features in particular. These
theories instead predict that either shared or personal environ-
ments are especially critical for variation in trustworthiness evalu-
ation, rather than genes. Thus, previous studies on face recognition
and general social trust predict a genetic basis to face trustworthi-
ness evaluation whereas social and statistical learning theories
predict a shared or personal environmental contribution instead.
Here, we carried out a twin study, allowing us to measure the
genetic and environmental contributions to individual differ-
ences in face trustworthiness evaluation. We found that variation
in face trustworthiness evaluation is largely shaped by variation
in personal environments, rather than genes or shared familial
environment. Our findings represent a rare example of a core
social perceptual capacity being predominantly shaped by a
person’s personal environment. We also investigated the speci-
ficity of individual differences in trustworthiness evaluation,
finding that variation in trustworthiness impressions dissociates
from variation in other core social perceptual judgments of at-
tractiveness and dominance. Using multivariate twin modeling,
we demonstrate that different personal experiences drive varia-
tion in each trait. Finally, we show that individual differences in
impressions also dissociate from identity and emotion recogni-
tion, representing core abilities in other major face perception
theories (24). Our findings provide insight into the development
of the social brain by demonstrating that a distinctive etiological
architecture underlies different aspects of variation in face per-
ception. Understanding variation in face perception has recently
become a major new direction of interest across scientific fields,
from visual science (18, 25) and social cognition (9) to psycho-
metrics and cognitive neuroscience (23).
Our aim to understand to what extent and why people vary in
face trustworthiness evaluation is timely: We are currently facing
a global societal shift in whom we trust, as trust in institutions
and objective expertise is replaced by trust in individuals and
personal connections (1, 2). With the rise of the internet, social
worlds have fragmented into echo chambers while political and
cultural divides widen (2). These echo chambers create potent
individual microenvironments of trust and mistrust. Simulta-
neously, disagreement on who is trustworthy has never been
higher. Our findings offer a different perspective to understand
to what extent and why we disagree when deciding whom to
trust: Exposure to different social information is itself a driver of
disagreement. Moreover, as the information we access online
becomes increasingly individual, our findings also suggest that
differences in whom we trust will further widen. Since individual
differences in face evaluation are primarily learned through ex-
perience, then these impressions may also be more malleable
than previously suggested (17). Modifying face trustworthiness
evaluation has considerable practical importance, given that
impressions of trustworthiness can bias real social and economic
outcomes (3).
Results
Our primary focus was on trustworthiness, given the central
importance of trust to human society. In order to understand the
specificity of our results with regard to trustworthiness, we ad-
ditionally included dominance and attractiveness control tasks as
these judgments represent other major dimensions of social
evaluation of faces (7, 8) and also wield considerable influence
on everyday decisions, including promotion choices (3) and
partner selection (26). We first developed standardized tests that
were capable of distinguishing stable individual differences in
trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness evaluation from
random or inconsistent responding. We developed such tests by
initially generating a large pool of candidate face stimuli, se-
lected for ecological validity, then iteratively refining reliability
and construct validity over three progressive waves of data col-
lection (total n = 1,344) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix,
Test development and reliability). Tests are available for future
research. We then used the refined tests to measure face im-
pressions in a large sample of 1,264 twin individuals (Materials
and Methods and SI Appendix, Table S3).
Despite the overwhelming focus in previous work on consen-
sus impressions of faces (reviewed in ref. 17), we found that a
substantial, stable, and significant proportion of variance in
trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness evaluations were
due to unique face preferences that differed across observers
(Fig. 1 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1).
Individual differences in facial impressions were quantified
using a multilevel modeling intraclass correlation method that
parsed variation in impressions. Specifically, we fit an intercept-
only multilevel model with random effects to estimate intraclass
correlations (ICCs) that reflect the proportion of variance in
ratings that can be explained by the faces, the participants, and
the interaction between faces and participants (SI Appendix,
Measuring individual differences in facial impressions). Critically,
individual differences in facial impressions are captured in the
model by the interaction between faces and participants, repre-
senting unique face preferences that differ across participants (9,
27). For example, one participant may consistently view narrow
faces as more trustworthy than wide faces whereas another
participant has the opposite perception. Consensus face im-
pressions and individual differences not directly related to faces,
such as overall trust, scale use, and so on, were captured in the
model as main effects for faces and participants (SI Appendix,
Sutherland et al. PNAS | May 12, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 19 | 10219
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Analysis of mean impressions). The finding of substantial stable
observer variation supports the classic idea that impressions can
be considerably idiosyncratic, lying at least partially in the “eye of
the beholder.” This result also motivates our main question of
where these individual differences come from. That is, what are
the genetic or environmental origins of individual differences in
facial evaluation of trustworthiness and other key traits?
We determined the origins of individual differences in facial
impressions using a classical twin design. Specifically, we com-
pared same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twins (157 twin pairs, 372 total
individuals) and monozygotic (MZ) twins (333 twin pairs, 781
total individuals) (Materials and Methods and SI Appendix, Table
S3). In order that similarity could be compared across DZ and
MZ twin pairs, we calculated face impression scores for each
twin to index individual differences in facial impressions (i.e., the
extent to which they agree or not with consensus facial impres-
sions of trustworthiness, dominance, or attractiveness) (Fig. 2A).
We found that variation in face trustworthiness evaluation was
largely shaped by people’s personal experiences, rather than
genetic differences or shared environments (Fig. 2A). To mea-
sure the heritability of face trustworthiness evaluation, we built
standard ACE twin models using OpenMx (version 2.11.5) in R
(version 3.5) (28). The ACE model is a multigroup structural
equation model which estimates the similarity between MZ and
DZ twin pairs, respectively. Although MZ and DZ twins share
family environment to a similar extent (29), MZ twins share, on
average, twice as much genetic variation as DZ twins. Thus,
additive genetic covariances are modeled differently for MZ
twins (fixed to 100% as they have 100% of their genetic influ-
ences in common) and DZ twins (fixed to 50% as they have, on
average, 50% of their genetic influences in common). There are
three main pathways in the model: the A pathway, representing
additive genetic covariance between twin pairs; the C pathway,
representing shared environmental covariance between twin
pairs; and the E pathway, representing unique or personal en-
vironmental influence and measurement error. A, C, and E es-
timates are derived by comparing MZ and DZ twin pair
similarity against the obtained data, using maximum likelihood
to determine the combination of parameters that best fits the
observed data. We obtained 95% CIs for parameter estimates
using likelihood-based confidence interval estimation in
OpenMx. We obtained these confidence intervals so that each
estimate can be statistically compared to zero to determine sig-
nificance at P < 0.05.
In the ACE models, the contribution of personal environ-
mental factors was 70 to 82% across all three facial impressions
(Table 1 and Fig. 2A). For all impressions, additive genetic
factors made the next-largest contribution although the genetic
influence was far smaller and not statistically significant (17 to
30%) (Table 1 and Fig. 2A). Shared environmental factors made
the smallest contribution, also not statistically significant (0 to
11%) (Table 1 and Fig. 2A). Systematic testing of simpler AE,
CE, and E models found that the AE model (i.e., C == 0)
showed the best fit for all three impressions; personal environ-
mental factors explained the majority of the variance in all
models tested.
Any estimation of the contribution of the personal environ-
ment includes measurement error; therefore, it is important to
demonstrate good reliability of measurement in twin studies
(29). Internal reliability for face impression scores was excellent
(r = 0.75–0.82, reliability is split-half and corrected for attenua-
tion; Table 1), and test–retest reliability was also acceptable (r =
0.52–0.73) as measured in an independent sample (n = 94) (SI
Appendix, Test development and reliability). Critically, reliability
was comparable to gold-standard tests in face perception (e.g.,
facial identity recognition) (30), especially for trustworthiness
(Fig. 2B). Reliability was also highly similar to reliability of
personality measures used in previous twin research (see ref. 15
for a review). Overall, the twins’ impressions, collected online,
also correlated highly with impressions from nontwins tested in
the laboratory (n = 214) and online (n = 94, r > 0.93 for all tests)
(SI Appendix, Table S1), demonstrating comparability between
unsupervised online versus laboratory-based assessments, as well
as between our twin sample and nontwin participants. Given the
high reliability of our tests, even when measured conservatively
(i.e., with an alternative-forms, test–retest procedure), the con-
tribution of personal environmental factors to variation in facial
impressions cannot be explained by unreliable measurement.
Instead, our findings lead us to conclude that variation in facial
impressions is primarily driven by unique life experiences.
Results were unchanged after controlling for performance on
a control (scene) evaluation task, age, sex, their products and
powers (second and third), and twin birth order (SI Appendix,
Table S6). Results were also unchanged if unpaired twins were
excluded, indicating that attrition in our twin sample did not
affect conclusions. Assumption tests for twin modeling were met,
including homogeneity across twin pairs and zygosity for both
means and variances (models corrected for outliers) (SI Appen-
dix, Twin analysis of individual differences in impressions) (results
did not change with outliers included).
Finally, the ACE modeling conclusions agreed with simple
calculations based on comparing intraclass correlations between
face impression scores for MZ twins with those for DZ twins
(Fig. 3A). If the face impression scores of MZ twins are (sig-
nificantly) more highly correlated than those of DZ twins, then
there is a genetic contribution to individual differences in im-
pressions. However, across all trait impressions, the 95% CIs for
the MZ and DZ twin correlations entirely overlapped. The same
conclusions were drawn when estimates were based on Fal-
coner’s formula (31) (Table 1 and SI Appendix, Table S4) and
when maximum likelihood correlations were used (SI Appendix,
Table S5). Across all of the tests, the majority of variance in
individual differences in trustworthiness, dominance, and at-
tractiveness evaluations was therefore attributable to nongenetic,
environmental factors.
The strong personal environmental contribution to variation
in facial evaluations found here stands in sharp contrast to
Fig. 1. Quantifying and explaining individual variation in face evaluation.
Variance in key facial impressions explained by Face, Observer, and the
unique combination of Face by Observer that reflects individual differences
in facial evaluation. Variance is computed through intraclass correlation
coefficients (ICCs) in a random-intercept multilevel model. Data from twin
sample. N observations = 379,200 (1,264 perceivers by three traits by 50 faces
by two trials). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals, fit using bootMer
from lme4 in R (2,000 bootstrap samples). Individual difference components
are substantial and significant.
10220 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1920131117 Sutherland et al.
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variation in facial identity recognition ability, which is almost
entirely genetically driven (Figs. 2C and 3B). The contrast be-
tween our present study of facial evaluation and previous studies
on facial identity recognition is also especially striking given that
the face-processing measures were reliable across these studies,
and our sample was drawn from the same twin registry as used in
a previous study of face identity recognition (12). Indeed, indi-
vidual differences in facial impressions did not associate with
either facial identity or emotional expression recognition ability
(Fig. 2B).
Given that personal environments shaped all three facial im-
pressions, a key question is whether the same or distinct envi-
ronmental factors are responsible for driving individual variation
across different impressions. The same environmental effect may
be responsible for variation across the three impressions, based
on theoretical accounts that suggest that individual differences in
impressions may be shaped by people’s general “diet” of faces,
including by typicality (20), familiarity (33), and/or statistical
learning (22). For example, faces that resemble those from one’s
own neighborhood, workplace, or school may receive generally
more favorable impressions, contributing to individual differ-
ences across the three traits. Alternatively, distinct environ-
mental factors may drive each impression. Models of facial
impressions suggest that attractiveness, trustworthiness, and
dominance can be dissociated at the group level (6, 7, 34). Here,
we also found that individual differences in the three impressions
were largely unrelated phenotypically (Fig. 2B and SI Appendix,
Table S2). Distinct environmental factors would support more
recent associative social learning theories which suggest that
people learn to trust certain facial attributes based on specific
previous social encounters (35, 36). For example, faces that re-
semble one’s friends may be viewed as particularly trustworthy
independent of the other impressions whereas faces that re-
semble one’s romantic partners may be viewed as particularly
attractive.
In order to address whether the same or distinct environ-
mental factors were driving individual variation across different
impressions, we modeled the trustworthiness, dominance, and
attractiveness impressions simultaneously using multivariate
modeling. Multivariate models divide the covariation between
traits into A, C, and E factors, allowing estimates of the extent to
which genetic and environmental influences on one impression
are shared with the other impressions. In an iterative procedure,
we compared full trivariate (Cholesky) models against more re-
strictive independent and common pathway models. The three
types of model all include specific and shared variance for each
impression but differ in how they partition the shared variance
across impressions (SI Appendix, Multivariate ACE modeling).
We also compared ACE models with simpler AE, CE, and E
models of each type (SI Appendix, Tables S7–S9). The AE
Cholesky model showed the best fit (as measured by AIC) (SI
Appendix, Table S7) although model fit did not vary greatly be-
tween models. Multivariate heritability was complicated by
negative genetic correlations, and not all confidence intervals
converged. Nevertheless, the clearest effects across all models
were substantial and significant effects for specific personal
Fig. 2. (A) Additive genetic (purple), shared environment (blue), and personal environment contributions (green; including measurement error) to pro-
portion (Prop.) variance explained in individual facial impressions, including ACE estimates averaged across the three impressions (boxes above) as well as
individual univariate ACE models (bars below; n = 1,153, N observations = 3,426) (SI Appendix). Error bars represent 95% CIs with a lower bound of zero. (B)
Individual differences in facial impressions are stable, with high internal reliability (shown on the diagonal, reliabilities are split-half and corrected for at-
tenuation). Individual differences in facial impressions of trustworthiness (Trust.), attractiveness (Attract.), and dominance (Dom.) dissociate and also diverge
from individual differences on identity recognition and expression labeling ability (shown on the off-diagonal, measured by Pearson’s correlations). Data are
from a nontwin participant group tested in the laboratory (n = 214, N observations = 1,070) (SI Appendix). (C) Best-fitting univariate AE twin models depicting
variance explained in individual facial impressions from the twin sample, together with variance explained in individual facial attractiveness and facial
identity recognition performance from different twin samples recruited from the same registry (12, 18). Hashing indicates upper-bound for estimates of
additive genetic contribution, based on test–retest reliability.
Sutherland et al. PNAS | May 12, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 19 | 10221
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environmental factors (i.e., not shared between impression
types), mirroring the univariate impression models (e.g., 71 to
82% in the AE Cholesky model) (SI Appendix, Tables S8 and
S9). This pattern is hard to explain with current familiarity,
typicality, or statistical learning theories (20–22) because these
theories are not context-specific: More familiar, typical, or nor-
mal faces should receive generally more favorable impressions,
and, therefore, individual differences should be shared across the
trait impressions. Instead, our results show that the environ-
mental context matters for learning. This pattern supports a
social learning model of individual differences in impressions,
whereby observers learn to associate specific trait information
with different facial cues (35, 36), but would also be consistent
with an updated account of statistical learning which allows for
contextual differences. The specificity of the environmental ef-
fects also rules out confounds, including a general halo or overall
differences in scale use, which would occur across all impressions.
Discussion
Here, we find large and stable individual variation in key facial
evaluations of trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness,
consistent with the classic idea that these visual judgments can be
shaped by “the eye of the beholder.” Using a twin study, we show
that this variation in facial evaluation is largely shaped by peo-
ple’s personal experiences, rather than by genetic factors or
shared environments. Highlighting the scope of personal expe-
rience to affect trust offers a different perspective on the fun-
damental basis, nature, and origin of individual trust and on our
capacity to change whom we trust, for good or for ill. As our lives
are increasingly affected by highly personalized social experi-
ences, especially online (1, 2), our findings suggest that dis-
agreements about whom we trust are also likely to increase.
Notably, our finding that variation in facial evaluation is driven
by personal environments stands in sharp contrast to variation in
facial recognition ability, which is almost entirely genetically
driven (25). Multivariate modeling showed that the environ-
mental factors driving individual differences in trustworthiness,
Table 1. Reliability, Falconer’s estimates, and variance component estimates for individual differences in trustworthiness, dominance,
and attractiveness facial impressions (as measured by facial impression scores; see main text)
Trustworthiness Dominance Attractiveness
Reliability
Internal (split-half) 0.75 0.82 0.80
Test–retest 0.73 0.58 0.52
Falconer’s formula: ACE estimates
A 0.11 0.10 0.14
C 0.20 0.08 0.10
E 0.70 0.82 0.77
Model fit: −2 log-likelihood; AIC (P value for
difference in −2 log-likelihood)
ACE 3,016.32; 732.32 2,984.34; 718.34 2,781.98, 503.98
AE 3,016.71; 730.71, P = 0.530 2,984.34; 716.34, P > 0.999 2,781.98; 501.98, P > 0.999
CE 3,017.16; 731.16, P = 0.359 2,985.73; 717.73, P = 0.238 2,784.66; 504.66, P = 0.102
E 3,051.54; 763.54, P < 0.001 2,997.67; 727.67, P = 0.001 2,813.3; 531.3, P < 0.001
Full model: ACE estimates (95% CI)
A 0.17 (0; 0.37) 0.18 (0; 0.27) 0.30 (0; 0.39)
C 0.11 (0; 0.33) 0 (0; 0.22) 0 (0; 0.30)
E 0.72 (0.63; 0.81) 0.82 (0.73; 0.92) 0.70 (0.61; 0.81)
Best-fit model: AE estimates (95% CI)
A 0.29 (0.20; 0.38) 0.18 (0.08; 0.27) 0.30 (0.20; 0.39)
E 0.71 (0.62; 0.80) 0.82 (0.73; 0.92) 0.70 (0.61; 0.80)
A, additive genetic influences; C, shared environmental influences; E, both personal environmental influences and measurement error. Lower and upper
bound 95% CIs are shown in parentheses for model estimates so that each estimate that does not touch zero is significant at alpha = 0.05 (two-sided). ACE,
df = 1,142, 1,133, 1,139 for trustworthiness, dominance, attractiveness. difference in df ACE-AE = 1; difference in df ACE-CE = 1; difference in df ACE-E = 2.
Fig. 3. Genetic and environmental contributions to face evaluation. (A)
Correlations between MZ and DZ twin pairs on face impression scores for
trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness, measured using intraclass
correlation coefficients (ICC[1,1]) (32). Bars show 95% CIs; the large overlap
between MZ and DZ correlations is indicative of a nongenetic contribution
to individual differences in facial impressions. CIs were calculated using a
bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap with 2,000 bootstrap samples. (B)
Plot of MZ vs. DZ intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the traits tested in the
present study, as well as attractiveness face impressions (18) and Cambridge
Face Memory Test face identity recognition ability (12, 13) reported else-
where for twins recruited from the same registry. The dashed line represents
the extreme case where all covariation within twin pairs is caused by shared
environmental factors, resulting in equal ICCs for MZ and DZ pairs. The solid
line represents the extreme case where all covariation within twin pairs is
caused by additive genetic factors, such that MZ ICC is twice that for DZ
pairs. Critically, in this case, the influence of both shared environmental
factors and additive genetic factors was small relative to personal environ-
mental factors. The further left and/or lower in the graph, the more idio-
syncratic the judgments and the higher the contribution of personal
environmental factors. All face evaluation results are well to the left of the
face identity recognition result. Bars show 95% CIs.
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dominance, and attractiveness evaluations were also largely in-
dependent. This pattern suggests that individual differences in
impression formation are based on different experiences, and
largely not based on overall or general familiarity, typicality, or
overall statistical learning (20–22). Instead, our results are sup-
portive of social learning theories, whereby unique social en-
counters shape individual associations between facial cues and
associated traits (35, 36), or could also motivate new statistical
learning theories which can account for the social context. Our
results shed light on a core aspect of human social perception
and indicate a remarkable diversity in the architecture of indi-
vidual variation across different components of face processing.
As well as revealing the etiology of individual differences in
trustworthiness and dominance evaluation, our results replicate
and extend a behavioral genetics study of individual aesthetic
judgments, which also found that individual differences in facial
attractiveness are driven by people’s personal experiences (18).
Our current study used a new, more diverse (e.g., in age) and more
naturalistic sample of faces. This demonstration of generalizability
is especially critical here because the faces used will strongly affect
the types of facial cues people can use to judge attractiveness and,
consequently, available individual differences (9, 27).
Interestingly, our results do not necessarily imply that familial
environment is unimportant even though the shared environ-
ment was not a major contributing factor. Siblings, including
twins, can have remarkably unique familial environments (reviewed
in ref. 29). For example, maternal affection can be very different
even across identical twin pairs (29). Early caregiver or familial
social experiences could therefore still influence unique mappings
of facial cues to impressions.
Finally, it is important to be clear that our findings about in-
dividual differences do not argue against the claim that facial
impressions of trustworthiness are adaptive, as suggested by
leading facial impression theories (5–7, 26). Major evolutionary
models of impressions have been based on consensus impres-
sions (see ref. 17 for a review) whereas twin studies are con-
cerned with individual variation. Facial cues that are critical for
survival or successful reproduction may in fact be particularly
strongly selected for, leading to consensus across individual
perceivers. Indeed, consensus impressions, particularly of trust-
worthiness, are remarkably similar across cultural contexts, al-
though there may be cultural “dialects” in impressions (37–39).
Our results suggest that a priority for future research should
be to understand the development of social evaluation of faces.
Especially, it will be critical to discover the developmental
drivers of individual differences in face impressions, rather than
focusing on potential genetic influences. We know little about
how early in development these individual differences occur or
which kinds of experiences are most consequential. One sug-
gestion, based on our current findings, is that individual inter-
actions with strangers, peers, and caregivers will be especially
critical. A key methodological contribution of the current work is
to provide a set of reliable tests of individual variation in trust
and other impressions, which will benefit developmental and
other research into individual differences in facial impression
formation. As individual differences in facial impressions and
identity recognition show distinctive etiologies, the perceptual
and neural mechanisms driving variation in facial impressions
will likely differ from those discovered in face recognition per-
ception so far (reviewed in ref. 25). In terms of perceptual
mechanisms, little is known about which facial features drive
idiosyncratic impressions although a wealth of research has il-
lustrated which facial features underlie consensus impressions
(e.g., smiling, femininity, and raised eyebrow height are generally
perceived as trustworthy) (6, 7). Idiosyncratic impressions could
result from individually specific weighting of the same features
that drive consensus trustworthiness impressions, as well as as-
sociations with additional features with trust or mistrust. Indeed,
different facial features are likely to drive trustworthiness vari-
ation for different people, depending on their personal experi-
ences (for example, one person may rely heavily on emotional
expression to judge trustworthiness whereas another person re-
lies on gender). Regarding neural mechanisms, plausible candi-
date neural regions driving individual impressions include the
amygdala and caudate, which encode associative facial trust
learning at the participant group level (23). Finally, the impor-
tance of individual experience, highlighted by our findings, mo-
tivates research to determine the long-term malleability of facial
evaluations. This research aim is particularly critical, given the
potential for these impressions to bias important social decisions,
from online dating to courtroom sentencing (3, 17).
To conclude, we provide compelling evidence for substantial
individual differences in impression formation and show that
these differences are largely driven by unique personal envi-
ronments, not genes (or shared environment). We also provide
reliable tests of individual differences in impression formation.
Our findings will speak to any scientist, philosopher, journalist,
artist, or curious person who wonders why we judge a book by its
cover, to what extent impressions lie in the eye of the beholder,
and how our experiences with family, friends, partners, or the
media might shape how we view the world.
Materials and Methods
Twin Participants. Twin participants were recruited from Twins Research
Australia (40). Recruitment, testing, and analysis protocols were preregis-
tered with Twins Research Australia and approved on 7 September 2017.
Twin data collection was carried out from 1 June 2018 until 16 November
2018. Our final twin sample consisted of 1,264 individuals aged 16 to 80 y old
(983 female; mean age, 47.4 y; SD age, 15.2 y), after a priori exclusions for
inattention (see SI Appendix, Twin sample for more details). Participants
were members of same-sex twin pairs (1,078 matched twin individuals and
186 unpaired twins).
For twin analyses, we excluded any participants with uncertain zygosity (SI
Appendix, Table S3), leaving n = 1,153 consisting of 781 MZ individuals (568
female; mean age, 47.2 y; SD age, 15.2 y) and 372 DZ individuals (318 female;
mean age, 49.8 y; SD age, 15.1 y). This subset included 490 matched twin
pairs: 333 MZ pairs (241 female pairs; mean age, 48.1 y; SD age, 16.2 y) and
157 DZ pairs (135 female pairs; mean age, 49.9 y; SD age, 15.1 y).
The twin study was reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Com-
mittee at the University ofWestern Australia and at Twins Research Australia.
Participants gave informed consent before taking part in the study, which
was conducted online. To incentivize careful participation, participants were
given feedback about how their ratings compared to those of the average
person (following ref. 41). Feedback was given after data collection was
complete.
Measures.
Facial impression tests. Three tests measured individual differences on the
three major dimensions of facial impressions: trustworthiness, dominance,
and attractiveness. Psychometric test development of the three impression
tests included extensive item selection (following ref. 18) (SI Appendix, Test
development and reliability). The tests are openly available for future re-
search. Test materials can be viewed online at https://www.testable.org/ex-
periment/855/674205/start. Data and code are available in ref. 42.
In each test, participants rated a different set of 100 unknown male and
female Caucasian faces, taken from a widely used, naturalistic face photo-
graph database (43). Participants were initially informed of the trait to be
rated and briefly viewed all 100 faces to familiarize them with the face
variability. Participants rated the faces on the given trait from 1 (“Not at all
trustworthy/dominant/attractive”) to 9 (“Very trustworthy/dominant/at-
tractive”). A subset of 50 faces was rated twice so that we could measure the
consistency of participants’ responses. Tests were self-paced, and each face
remained on the screen until the response (median response time: 2.3 s).
Participants completed the primary trustworthiness task first and then the
control dominance and attractiveness tasks. Test development studies were
reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee at the University of
Western Australia, and all participants provided informed consent. Data
collection for test development studies was carried out between the 16
August 2017 and 8 May 2018.
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Tests measure individual differences in facial impressions (i.e., the extent
to which different people agree or not with consensus facial impressions of
trustworthiness, dominance, or attractiveness) (Fig. 1). Specifically, scores on
the tests represent a participant’s overall agreement with average impres-
sions on those faces, after controlling for unreliability in that participant’s
responses, so that differences in perception are not confounded by un-
reliability (following ref. 18). To quantify individual unreliability, we calcu-
lated the correlation between each participant’s ratings of the subset of
repeated faces across time points, resulting in a “self-consistency” score for
each participant. The lower the “self-consistency” score, the higher the
unreliability. We calculated each participant’s agreement with the mean by
correlating their individual ratings of the 100 faces (the first time they were
seen) with the group mean ratings. We used a linear regression model to
predict each participant’s agreement score from their self-consistency score.
The face impression scores are the residuals obtained from this model, which
represent participants’ agreement with the group mean, after controlling
for individual participants’ unreliability. High face impression scores reflect
low idiosyncrasy.
Scenes control task.After the face tests, participants viewed a control task of 50
scenes (images taken from ref. 44), with a subset of 24 repeated scenes.
Participants rated these scenes on their general preference (“how attractive
do you find this scene?”) from 1 (not at all attractive) to 7 (very attractive).
This scene task acted as a control for individual variation in scale use, in-
cluding participants’ general idiosyncrasy, tendency to agree, and so on (18).
Zygosity and Demographics. Participants provided demographic information,
including age and sex. Twin participants also gave us their birth order and
completed an eight-item self-report questionnaire about their zygosity (45).
Zygosity was determined using a latent class modeling approach (45).
Analysis. To compare twin models, we used −2 log-likelihood ratio tests
(which approximate a distribution, with associated significance values to
indicate a change in model fit) as well as Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
(a lower AIC is better). We interpreted the size of genetic and environmental
effects in line with previous effect size guidelines for twin modeling (29, 46).
All CIs are 95% and all P values are two-tailed.
Data Availability. Data, code, and materials are available in ref. 42. The face
impression tests can be viewed at https://www.testable.org/experiment/855/
674205/start.
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